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     To my near and dear 
 
 
 
Science is facts; just as houses are made of 
stone, so is science made of facts; but a pile 
of stones is not a house, and a collection of 
facts is not necessarily science. 
 
- Jules Henri Poincaré 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Influenza is caused by influenza A virus, a single stranded RNA virus of the 
orthomyxoviridae family. In humans, it causes yearly outbreaks with high morbidity and 
excess fatality rates as a direct effect. Placed in its ecological niche however, in dabbling 
ducks, avian influenza virus (AIV) induce quite mild disease. It is when the virus crosses the 
species barrier that pathogenic traits are attributed to infection. Also infection of close 
relatives to dabbling ducks, the domestic chicken, cause morbidity and may in some cases 
change the virus into a highly pathogenic variant with nearly 100% fatality rate. Being a very 
adaptable virus, these spill-over events are frequent, and numerous species are susceptible to 
influenza virus. When a subtype of influenza which has not previously infected humans 
crosses the species barrier, adapts to humans and spread easily, a pandemic event is imminent. 
There is no cure for influenza infection, and vaccination is a cumbersome endeavor, so 
currently the strategy when a pandemic strikes is damage control. 
In this thesis, I have been involved in a surveillance project, to increase our knowledge of 
how influenza travels across the globe with its natural host. We have also used animal models 
to investigate the pathological effects in mallard ducks and their susceptibility to re-infection. 
Furthermore, we have evaluated the effect and the potential risk of frivolous use of the anti-
viral agent oseltamivir, and also investigated a novel approach to the classic virus isolation 
method of growing virus in embryonated chicken eggs (ECE’s). 
 
Indication was found in northern Alaska that prevalence of influenza is probably not lower 
here than in other breeding areas for dabbling ducks, as has been previously suggested. As 
these birds travel over the Bering Strait, the reason for the genetic isolation of Eurasian and 
North American influenza A strains remains unclear. 
 Inoculation of mallards equipped with subcutaneous data transmitters indicated very little 
effect on the host and no stress above background level, and all birds gained weight 
throughout the trial. Only in four of six birds (65%) could a small temperature increase related 
to infection be recorded. However, more studies in a natural environment need to be 
conducted, to discern whether this variable is associated with an ecological cost as the captive 
trial ducks had access to food ad libitum. 
The most commonly used anti-viral drug, oseltamivir, is poorly degraded in sewage plants 
and surface water, where dabbling ducks forage. Extensive use of the drug thus increases 
environmental levels of the active metabolite, oseltamivir carboxylate (OC). We show that 
mallards inoculated with A/H1N1 in an OC enriched environment generates resistant virus 
sporadically at OC level found today. Higher level of OC caused the resistant subspecies to 
dominate the virus population, which is not desirable in the influenza reservoir. An 
introduction of a OC-resistant pandemic virus to the human population would render the only 
antiviral defense toothless. 
Isolation of influenza virus is traditionally performed by inoculation of infectious material 
into embryonated chicken eggs. As the chicken host is known to induce changes in AIV, we 
compared isolating and passaging two viruses both in ECE’s and embryonated mallard eggs. 
Both egg species induced mutations in the primary passage, with no furthers changes in 
subsequent passages. Only in ECE’s did one virus maintain wild-type configuration before 
one mutation was observed. Mallard eggs can based on these results not be advocated as 
preferable to ECE’s when isolating and passaging AIV. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Novel introductions of influenza viruses into the human population from the animal kingdom 
continue to be a major health problem worldwide. Historically, we have been ill-prepared for 
pandemics that strike fast and with no warning, and the notion of influenza as a disease that 
comes from animals is fairly new. During the last decade, influenza research has intensified to 
previously unseen magnitudes, and together with this, also the interest in the inclusive 
virology research that focuses on influenza not only as a human pathogen but as an entity that 
is part of an ecosystem. With an increased knowledge of the dynamics of the ecosystem, and 
the interplay of the parts therein, the goal is for human science to be able to more accurately 
predict new pandemics and take appropriate preventive countermeasures. 
 
1.1  Background 
Placed in its ecological niche, commonly in dabbling ducks, influenza A virus is a benign 
disease (Jourdain, Gunnarsson et al. 2010). However, it is a very adaptable virus and it has 
been able to infect, and adapt to, a wide range of hosts (Webster, Bean et al. 1992). The 
disease associated with infection shows a broad range of symptoms, depending in part on the 
genetic properties of the virus, but also on which species of host is infected (Horimoto and 
Kawaoka 2005; Kishida, Sakoda et al. 2005; Isoda, Sakoda et al. 2006). In the natural host, no 
signs of infection can be identified by ocular inspection, while other bird species and 
mammals are more severely affected with symptoms ranging from very mild to very severe 
and ultimately death. It was first identified as an animal disease in 1878, when Eduardo 
Perroncito described a disease affecting poultry in northern Italy. Observations from this 
study describe an easily transmitted, initially mild disease which increased in pathogenicity 
over time and in the end killed virtually all domestic fowl in the area. “Fowl plague”, as the 
disease would be called, was proved to be a viral disease in 1901 but not identified as 
influenza virus until 1955 (Capua and Mutinelli 2001). Since it was first described in 1878, 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus has caused 21 documented outbreaks of fowl 
plague between 1959 and 2003 (WHO 2004).  
As a human disease, it is hard to know when it was first introduced to the human population, 
or when it became truly endemic. Epidemics that may well have been influenza have been 
described, more or less accurately, by physicians for over 2000 years. The first verifiable 
influenza pandemic however, is the Russian flu of 1889-1892 (Nicholson 1998). Since, 
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several pandemics of varying severity have struck the world, each deriving from an 
introduction of a novel virus, or parts thereof, from the animal kingdom (Kawaoka, Krauss et 
al. 1989). The most sinister example of how horrific an introduction of an easily transmitted 
virus may be to a naïve human population is the 1918 pandemic, commonly known as the 
“Spanish flu”. It swept across the world in three waves, increasing in virulence each year, and 
leaving over 20 million people dead in its tracks (Erkoreka 2010). As the world watched, 
appalled by the effects of the disease, intense research was initiated to understand the 
causative agent. It would not be until 1933, however, that a filterable substance was isolated 
which induced influenza-like symptoms in humans and was easily transmitted between ferrets 
(Smith 1933). Kochs postulate was later fulfilled after the influenza virus could be isolated 
from the throat of one of the team members after having been sneezed upon by one of the 
ferrets and subsequently developed influenza symptoms (Nicholson 1998). Despite thorough 
research where the molecular functions of the virus have been investigated in detail, influenza 
A virus continues to be a common human pathogen and each year the endemic, seasonal flu, 
results in mortality peaks and wide-spread morbidity with vast economic consequences 
(Franco-Paredes, Hernandez-Ramos et al. 2009). Rather than having been able to control this 
infection, we have adapted ourselves and our behaviour to minimize its damage when the flu 
season strikes (Robinson 1990; Webster 2002). Random introductions of novel viruses from 
the animal kingdom also continue to be a major health- and economical problem for the 
human population, and several pandemic events have occurred during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries, including the notorious “Spanish Flu” (Hope-Simpson and Golubev 1987; Del Rio 
and Hernandez-Avila 2009; Morens, Taubenberger et al. 2010). It is believed that this first 
recorded pandemic was the result of a direct transmission of a highly pathogenic avian virus 
to humans, without intermediate hosts, although this belief has recently been called to 
question (Reid, Fanning et al. 2004; Antonovics, Hood et al. 2006). Later pandemics did not 
occur in the same direct fashion but used pigs, which are permissive to both avian and human 
adapted viruses, as mixing vessels (Ito, Couceiro et al. 1998). Until 1977 and the “Russian 
flu” pandemic, each time a new subtype emerged and spread globally it replaced the 
previously circulating strain of influenza virus (Bean, Cox et al. 1980). 
 
1.1.1  Influenza A virology  
Influenza A virus belongs to the Orthomyxoviridae family together with influenza B, 
influenza C, isavirus and thogotovirus (Murray 2009). It is a pleomorphic virus containing 
eight gene segments, and the virion is made up by the interior matrix (M1) protein and the 
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nucleocapsid, consisting of viral RNA, nucleoprotein (NP) and the three polymerase proteins 
making up the transcriptase (Murray 2009). The nucleocapsid is enveloped by a host-derived 
membrane containing three viral proteins; hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA) and 
matrix 2 (M2). Classification and the nomenclature of influenza A viruses is based on what 
type of HA and NA is present in the membrane (WHO 1980). There are to date 16 
serologically distinct HA types, and nine different NA types described (Fouchier, Munster et 
al. 2005).  
 
1.1.2 Nomenclature 
Each virus is named after its serological phenotype, starting with determining if it belongs to 
influenza A, B or C, after which place of sampling/isolation is stated, then serial number of 
the sampling protocol and year (WHO 1980). Last the subtype is stated in parenthesis. 
Example: A/Sweden/937/09 (H5N2). When a virus is isolated from a species other than 
human, it is specified between serological type and geographic location of the sampling. 
Example: A/Mallard/Sweden/937/09 (H5N2). 
 
1.1.3     Replication 
The wide range of hosts to influenza A virus and its ability to adapt to new species, may in 
part be due to the variability of its genome. The genome consists of eight single-stranded, 
negative sense RNA segments (Lamb and Choppin 1983). Single stranded genomes allow for 
high mutation rates, as there is no second strand that can otherwise be used for proof-reading 
(Webster, Shortridge et al. 1997). Errors typically occur during transcription at a rate of 1/10
3
 
to 1/10
4
 nucleotides for single stranded genome viruses versus 1/10
8
 nucleotides in double 
stranded DNA viruses (Holland, Spindler et al. 1982; Duffy, Shackelton et al. 2008). Unlike 
for complex, large genome species, this is a beneficial trait as it can help the virus to adapt 
quickly, should a new environment present a different selection pressure. Having a segmented 
genome of influenza A also allows for another way to change its composition, i.e antigenic 
shift. This may occur if one cell becomes simultaneously infected by two different influenza 
A viruses (Hinshaw, Bean et al. 1980). As many as 256 different variants may then be formed 
through reassortment of the different segments. 
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1.2 Virus structure and function 
The eight gene segments code for ten or eleven proteins, depending on the presence of an 
alternative reading frame in one of the polymerase genes. This alternative reading frame gives 
rise to the protein now known as PB1-F2, able to induce apoptosis in cells by aiding in the 
release of cytochrome C from the mitochondrial membrane (Chen, Calvo et al. 2001). 
However, this extra reading frame is not present in all influenza A viruses, and the essential 
genes for virus infectivity and production are ten: HA, NA, matrix 1 (M1), M2, nucleoprotein 
(NP), non-structural protein 1 (NS1), nuclear export protein (NS2/NEP) and three polymerase 
subunits PA, PB1 and PB2 (Knipe 2007). 
HA and NA mediates virus entry and release respectively, and M2 is a pH dependant ion 
channel (Sugrue and Hay 1991). The M1 protein is located under the viral envelope and 
interacts with the ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complex (Murti, Brown et al. 1992). It is widely 
accepted that the function of the protein is to provide protection to the RNPs and to give the 
virus rigidity and structure. Evidence for this plausible function, however, has proven difficult 
to obtain (Knipe 2007). The non-structural proteins NS1 and NS2/NEP have dynamic 
functions for virus replication and survival post infection. NS1 is expressed abundantly in 
infected cells, and has multiple functions. It binds to double-stranded RNA to prevent 
association with cellular protein kinase R (PKR) that would otherwise recognize it as foreign 
and trigger the innate immune response, which is further discussed under 1.3.1 (Lu, Wambach 
et al. 1995; Hatada, Saito et al. 1999; Williams 1999; Kuiken, Holmes et al. 2006). It is also 
responsible for diverting cell translation and the suppression of the host cell’s post-
transcriptional processing of mRNA (Geiss, Salvatore et al. 2002; Hilleman 2002; Baigent 
and McCauley 2003). NS2/NEP plays a vital role in virus replication, regulating the export of 
RNP complexes from the nucleus and the relative transcription of the influenza gene segments 
(Robb, Smith et al. 2009).  
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Genome segment Proteins coded Main function 
1 PB2 Sub-unit of RNA-polymerase 
2 PB1 
PB1-F2 
Sub-unit of RNA-polymerase 
Function unknown, pro-apoptotic 
3 PA Sub-unit of RNA-polymerase 
4 HA Viral attachment and membrane fusion 
5 NP Major structural component 
6 NA Release of new virions by preventing aggregation 
7 M1  Facilitating migration of viral RNP in cell 
 M2 Ion channel involved in uncoating of virus 
8 NS1 Post-transcription modulation, interferon antagonist 
 NS2/NEP Mediates nuclear export of vRNAs 
 
Table 1. Influenza A virus components and their main function 
 
1.2.1  Entry 
The surface protein HA allows virus to attach to sialic acid (SA) receptors on the host cell 
surface (Knipe 2007). This event triggers a cell-mediated endocytosis, and the virus find itself 
enclosed in an endosome (Dales and Choppin 1962; Patterson, Oxford et al. 1979). 
Endocytosis is an intrinsic mechanism of eukaryotic cells used to ingest and digest material 
from its surrounding. After endocytosis, the endosome undergoes a functional transition to 
become a lysosome, which degrades and digests the material within (Alberts B 2002). Among 
other changes in this transition such as the import of digestive proteases, the interior pH is 
lowered, which is of importance for influenza virus replication. As pH decreases in this 
environment, the HA surface protein undergoes a structural change that enables interaction 
with the endosome membrane, to fuse it with the virus membrane and release the RNA-RNP 
constructs into the cytoplasm (Matlin, Reggio et al. 1981; Stegmann, Morselt et al. 1987; 
Skehel and Wiley 2000). For this critical fusion step to take place, however, the native 
structure of HA must be changed. When HA is expressed by a virus-producing cell, it is in its 
native, non-infective form, HA0. Post-translational cleavage of the protein into HA1 and HA2 
is necessary for the endocytosed virion to fuse its membrane with that of the endosome 
(Scholtissek 1986). The cleavage of HA is a controlled mechanism which can only be 
performed by a specific enzyme that is not expressed in all cell types, which limits infection 
to certain tissues, though exactly what tissue is infected varies between species (Nagai 1993; 
Nagai 1995; Kido, Murakami et al. 1999). 
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1.2.2  Translation 
Upon release of RNP complexes into the cytoplasm, the NP protein interacts with the cellular 
transport protein importin α, with the result of RNP complexes being imported into the 
nucleus (Martin and Helenius 1991; O'Neill, Jaskunas et al. 1995). Viral RNA is then 
transcribed into positive sense RNA by the virus’ own RNA-dependant polymerase. This 
positive sense RNA can then be used for transcribing new negative sense vRNA, or be 
exported as mRNA to the cytosol where it is translated into viral proteins. Viral surface 
proteins will be translated through the golgi apparatus and transported to the cell surface and 
ultimately form dense clusters in the lipid rafts of the cell membrane (Scheiffele, Roth et al. 
1997; Barman and Nayak 2000). The other proteins will be transported into the nucleus and 
form new nucleocapsids together with the new vRNA. 
 
1.2.3 Assembly and budding 
Assembled nucleocapsids containing negative sense vRNA and the core proteins are exported 
from the nucleus in a regulated manner, and transported to the membrane under the lipid rafts 
which contain clusters of viral surface proteins. Cellular exocytosis of the nucleocapsids will 
then form complete progeny virus with an envelope derived from the cellular membrane 
(Suomalainen 2002). However, as HA can bind SA receptors immediately, progeny virus will 
stick like glue to the host cell, and only when NA cleaves the SA is the virion released from 
the cell surface (Gottschalk 1957; Mitnaul, Castrucci et al. 1996). 
 
1.3 Transmission 
The influenza A virus, as other viruses, cannot replicate outside a host cell. In order to infect 
new individuals it needs to persist for some time outside a host organism. It seems that the 
influenza A virus is well adapted to persist in water. Under experimental conditions, avian 
influenza A virus strains stored in distilled water at +28 °C could remain infective for 100 
days, at 17 °C for 200 days and possibly for as long as 1000 days at +4 °C (Stallknecht, Shane 
et al. 1990). However, under natural conditions, persistence of active virus is limited by the 
effects of pH, salinity, UV-radiation and presence of biologically active material such as 
degrading enzymes, bacteria and other microorganisms. Human influenza A virus strains are 
stable at a pH from neutral to 8.5, and infectivity decreases rapidly below pH 6.0. Avian 
influenza A virus strains exhibit more stability than human influenza A virus strains and can 
persist and remain active at pH 4.0 whereas human isolates do not persist pH below 5.0 
(Webster, Yakhno et al. 1978). Infectivity is inversely related to salt content of water for 
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avian influenza A virus (Stallknecht, Kearney et al. 1990). In open air, human strains of 
influenza A virus can spread as an aerosol. The persistence and infectivity of these strains in 
open air is promoted by low humidity. Aerosols containing influenza A virus may remain 
infective for up to 24 hours or more at low humidity but only for an hour at high humidity  
(Hemmes, Winkler et al. 1960). Other limiting factors in open air are UV-radiation and wind. 
Some strains of influenza A virus can also be spread via fomites on hard surfaces such as 
stainless steel, where it can survive for up to two days (Bean, Moore et al. 1982). Thus many 
factors determine the suitability of different environments for persistence, infectivity and 
transmission of influenza A virus. 
 
1.4 Clinical picture of human infection 
Influenza A virus infection is most often a self-limiting disease with abrupt onset of high 
fever, malaise, cough and head and muscle ache. It causes symptoms for up to 2 weeks and 
requires on average 3-4 days of bed rest. The disease can be severe and sometimes lethal in 
young children, the elderly, those who are under immune suppression and people with 
underlying illnesses such as cardiac disease or asthma (Mandell, Douglas et al. 2005). A 
central question is how an infection essentially localized to the respiratory tract can produce 
such severe constitutional symptoms. As in many other infectious diseases, it is the immune 
response that contributes substantially to the clinical signs and symptoms in influenza and 
finally to the control of infection. These immune mechanisms can lead to both localized as 
well as systemic effects, i.e the local inflammation of the upper respiratory tract and the 
systemic muscle ache. However, in the case of highly pathogenic influenza viruses, the 
specific tropism for the upper respiratory tract is lost. The full mechanism for this 
characteristic remains unclear, but can in part be explained as the cleavage site of the HA 
protein is extended by several basic amino acids (Kuiken, Holmes et al. 2006). This allows for 
ubiquitous cleavage and this activation of the virus, and an unrestricted infectivity of to all 
cells to which the virus can bind. Other factor that enables the virus to enter the blood stream, 
survive, and exit at novel sites are less well known (Smith and Sweet 1988). Another factor is 
a deficiency in NS1, resulting in hyper inflammation, which is further discussed under 
subheading 1.5.3. Systemic infection and a hyper induced immune system combined can 
cause shock and multi organ failure, which defines the highly pathogenic variant of influenza. 
To date, only subtypes H5 and H7 have been able to become highly pathogenic, and trials 
have shown that only the introduction of a polybasic cleavage site may not be enough for 
other subtypes to become highly pathogenic (Steinhauer 1999; Stech, Veits et al. 2009). The 
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disease in the confirmed cases has been severe, often fatal. The most common symptoms have 
been high fever, lower respiratory tract symptoms of pneumonia progressing to acute 
respiratory distress, and leucopenia has been a common laboratory finding. Some cases have 
presented atypical symptoms such as diarrhea, vomiting, bleeding from the nose and gums 
and encephalopathologic signs.  
 
1.5 Immunity and defense 
To defend ourselves against the multifaceted fauna of microbes we are frequently assaulted 
by, we have quite impressive defense mechanism: the immune system. Parasites, bacteria and 
viruses have very different biological properties, and different strategies and targets inside the 
host organism. It is thus imperative for the immune system to be able to recognize a wide 
array of potential threats, and to adapt to the micro-fauna of our immediate surroundings. In 
general terms, the immune system can be divided into two main categories with regard to 
memory function. 1: The innate response, which is rather unspecific, but with an immediate 
reaction to the infection. 2: The adaptive immune response, which takes longer to react, but 
has the ability to remember chemical features of a pathogen and to respond more quickly and 
strongly the second time the same pathogen is encountered. These features are common to all 
vertebrates, and though there are minor differences in cell appearance and peptide sequences, 
discussions on mechanisms driving immunity can be extrapolated from human biology to any 
vertebrate (Pastoret 1998; Erf 2004).  
 
1.5.1 Innate immune responses 
As the name implies, the innate immune system are immediately ready to react to and combat 
pathogens without prior exposure. The mechanisms in the innate immune response are many 
and complex, but they all share the direct action and lack of memory. Most prominent in the 
non specific recognition of pathogens is the innate immunity’s ability to discriminate “self 
from non-self”, but apart from this, the innate immune response can react to general markers 
of many pathogens, like the cell surface lipopolysaccarides and flagellin of pathogenic 
bacteria or double stranded RNA of viruses and unmethylated bacterial and viral DNA. Cells 
of the innate immune system can quickly release pro-inflammatory cytokines like interferon 
and TNF-α to promote leukocytes to migrate to the area and stimulate pathogen clearance. 
Leukocytes are specialized in the ingestion and digestion of foreign particles, and they also 
use the degraded parts of whatever they just destroyed to stimulate the adaptive immune 
response through antigen presentation. The adaptive response is thus dependant on the innate 
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response, but not vice versa. When cells have been activated by interferon, they remain in that 
state for a period of time during which their resistance to new infections is markedly 
increased. In the case of influenza infection, it has been shown that an activated innate 
immune response can be protective for re-infection, both of homo- and heterotypic strains of 
influenza A virus (van der Goot, de Jong et al. 2003; Furuya, Chan et al. 2010).  
As a last resort, every cell in the body has the ability to kill itself in a controlled manner when 
its mechanisms become hijacked, via apoptosis. Apoptosis can be induced by extracellular 
factors, or by innate systems in the cell itself (Takizawa, Matsukawa et al. 1993; Hinshaw, 
Olsen et al. 1994).  
 
1.5.2 Adaptive immunity 
When the adaptive immune response is activated, antibodies are produced with high 
specificity and affinity to the pathogen. Often there are, during a primary infection, only a 
small number of antibody producing cells that are able to be activated to a pathogen, and this 
response is amplified by cell division. Memory is the prominent feature of adaptive immunity, 
and once sensitized to a specific peptide, or part of a protein deriving from an infectious 
agent, memory cells retain their ability to produce highly specific antibodies to the pathogen, 
but stay in a dormant state. Upon a secondary infection, the response from memory cells is 
faster and much stronger than the response from naïve cells. Thus the immune system is able 
to neutralize the assault faster and more efficiently after the first time the pathogen is 
encountered. In fact, it is so efficient that the host often doesn’t even get sick before the 
infection is cleared. The function of antibodies can vary, from directly assaulting a pathogen 
with a complement system that forms pores in the pathogen, causing water influx and lysis, to 
function as a flag for phagocytic cells or the direct neutralization of viruses by covering them 
and so physically blocking them from interacting with their potential targets (Pastoret 1998). 
 
1.5.3  Viral countermeasures 
For a virus to survive and propagate over time, it needs to overcome the immune system’s 
mechanisms of viral control and clearance. It can achieve this actively by interacting directly 
with components of the immune system and manipulate its action, or passively by preventing 
its recognition in the first place (Wang, Li et al. 2000). 
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 Innate immune manipulation 
Being a negative-stranded RNA virus, influenza A is a potent inducer of the innate immune 
response, and the symptoms from inflammation could be worse still. However, the virus has 
specific mechanisms to prevent this. One of the NS1 protein’s main features is that it inhibits 
the cell’s ability to produce interferon, a potent pro-inflammatory cytokine and one of the first 
to be released by the innate immune response upon infection (Pauli, Schmolke et al. 2008). 
Newly synthesized viral RNA is complementary to the template and forms double-stranded 
RNA, which is not a normal feature in the cell. PKR is a cellular protein able to identify and 
respond to double-stranded RNA, and trigger a cascade of anti-viral protein expression. The 
NS1 protein is specialized in sequestering the double stranded RNA, preventing recognition 
and thus limit or inhibit the response. In the case of highly pathogenic influenza viruses, a 
mutation in the NS gene may be partly responsible for the increased pathogenic properties 
(Cheung, Poon et al. 2002). By failing to repress the early cytokine expression, the virus 
triggers a strong cytokine response, and combined with a systemic infection the inflammation 
becomes much more severe than during a local infection of a human adapted influenza virus 
(de Jong, Simmons et al. 2006; Kash, Tumpey et al. 2006). NS1 also prolongs virus 
production by inhibiting apoptosis in infected cells (Zhirnov, Konakova et al. 2002). 
 
 Escape from adaptive immunity 
Where escape from innate immune responses involves association of NS1 newly produced 
double-stranded RNA, escape from the adaptive immune response is less direct. There are two 
ways for influenza A viruses to escape adaptive immunity, both of which ultimately changes 
the coating of the virion to render it unrecognizable by neutralizing antibodies, but through 
different mechanism. Primarily, and constantly ongoing, is the antigenic drift. As the single 
stranded RNA genome allows for a high mutation rate and rapid evolution, the virus will 
automatically be less recognizable by antibodies as the structure of the surface proteins 
change over time. Secondly, with instant major antigenic change is the antigenic shift. 
Antigenic shift occurs when one cell becomes infected by two different subtypes of influenza. 
The segmented genome allows for random combinations of the genetic setup as progeny virus 
is assembled, with as many as 255 new combinations as the result (Bouvier and Palese 2008). 
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1.6  Treatment strategies 
To counteract the virus’ ability to escape and repress the immune system there are two 
approaches to lessen the burden of influenza infection in humans. Primarily there is the 
preventive approach, using vaccines to prepare the body for infection and priming the 
adaptive immune system as though it had been previously infected. This is naturally the 
method of choice as it prevents an infection from taking hold. However, once infected, 
receiving vaccine does not affect the outcome of the disease and does not alleviate the 
symptoms. Should this happen, there are antiviral substances that directly hinder the viral 
replication, shorten period of morbidity and decrease mortality. 
 
1.6.1 Vaccines 
Vaccination against a disease utilizes the adaptive immune system’s ability to remember a 
pathogen. By exposing the immune system to only a part of a pathogen, along with an 
inflammatory agent called an adjuvant, the immune system is stimulated to associate the 
foreign agent to a physical assault. The body then responds as it would to a natural infection, 
producing antibodies, memory cells and thus immunity to an assault by a pathogen with the 
same recognition sites that were used in the vaccine (Goldsby 2003). In the case of influenza 
A virus, the surface protein HA is used in the vaccine, causing the body to form neutralizing 
antibodies to the protein that otherwise would adhere to the target cell surface (Ruben 1990). 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Illustration of vaccination and immunity. Injection of an antigen enables the immune system to produce 
antibodies able to recognize and neutralize a pathogen carrying the same antigen used in the vaccine. 
By permission of Mayo Foundation and Medical Research. All rights reserved. 
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1.6.2 Antiviral drugs 
Antiviral substances directly interact and inhibit specific steps in the virus’ life cycle and slow 
or completely arrest its propagation (Murray 2009). To date there are four antiviral drugs for 
influenza virus, two of which (oseltamivir and zanamivir) target the NA protein, and the other 
two (amantadine and rimantadine) the M2 protein. Amantadine and rimantadine interacts at 
an early stage of the replication by blocking the M2 ion channel, which prevents the ion influx 
and the disassembly of the nucleocapsid (Pinto and Lamb 2007). When M2 is blocked, the 
M1 protein fails to disassociate from the RNPs prior to the membrane fusion event, and M1-
associated RNPs are released into the cytosol, and transport of RNPs into the nucleus is 
blocked (Martin and Helenius 1991). In the case of NA, oseltamivir and zanamivir inhibit the 
neuraminidase enzymatic activity. It does not prevent the virus from infecting cells or its 
replication, but inhibits the release of progeny virus (He, Massarella et al. 1999). These drugs 
are more benign to the patient, and are not associated with side effects to the same extent as 
has been reported for amantadine and rimantadine (Jefferson, Demicheli et al. 2006). 
 
1.6.3 Resistance 
There is no resistance to vaccines that the virus can develop except the escape strategy from 
the natural response to secondary infections. Antivirals however, are unchanging substances 
to which resistance can be developed. Most health organizations today recommend the use of 
oseltamivir and zanamivir. Although M2 blockers are medically approved for use, the 
majority of human circulating strains of influenza have grown resistant to these drugs (CDC 
2008). A long period of generous use of influenza antiviral drugs and the adaptation of the 
viruses to cope has made the medical world more restrictive in the prescription of the more 
novel oseltamivir and zanamivir. Even so, resistance spreads rapidly in the new millennium 
(Sy, Lee et al. 2010). Media coverage of the threat of new pandemics has used the potential 
threat to create sensational and frightening news stories. This has dramatically increased the 
demand for antiviral drugs, and prophylactic use has become common. With resistance to 
oseltamivir on the rise, the interest for new targets for antiviral drugs has increased (Balannik, 
Wang et al. 2009). 
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1.7 Ecology 
All viruses have (at least) one species with which it is constantly co-evolving. The ideal 
situation for a virus is when the immune response of the host is subverted, but the host does 
not contract acute disease from infection. Viruses that are highly adapted to humans and do 
not affect our fitness, gives the virus a long lived host with the opportunity to spread the virus 
to many new carriers. Failure to maintain such a live-and-let-live relationship would result in 
adverse effects for one of the parts, and regardless of which, the event will lessen the fitness 
of the virus. Thus, in a stable system, the virus is always near-optimal in its interaction with 
the host, and few mutations are truly beneficial for virus fitness, and thus the antigenic drift 
over time is small. New subspecies variants have no survival advantage and are thus not 
successfully sustained. Upon a selection changing event such as a transfer between species, 
where the virus is in a less than optimal state in relation to the host, more mutations allow for 
more rapid growth, and the genetic drift is increased.  
Although recent studies show that the antigenic drift of influenza A viruses occur at a similar 
rate in the natural host environment as it does in temporal hosts, it is only when the virus has 
crossed the species barrier a highly pathogenic form have evolved (Chen and Holmes 2006). 
What factors in certain hosts are selective for such a trait is still unknown, but there is likely a 
specific pressure for this, as the same virulence have spawned many times from the same 
event of species transfer from dabbling ducks to chickens (Wood, McCauley et al. 1993). 
Influenza A virus has been found infectious to a wide range of species, but it is only among 
aquatic birds all 16 HA subtypes have been found (Webster, Bean et al. 1992; Fouchier, 
Munster et al. 2005). Infection of these animals result in no obvious signs of disease, and the 
infection is believed to be asymptomatic, though there is indication of ecological costs 
(Latorre-Margalef, Gunnarsson et al. 2009). Benign signs of disease, or asymptomatic 
infection points to a stable virus-host relationship, and the greater number of subtypes found 
indicates a long period of co-evolution. Although other birds are not considered as natural 
hosts, the virus crosses the species barrier relatively easy. When this has been documented, 
the event has been associated with a dramatic increase in virus mutation rate (Alexander and 
Brown 2000; Capua and Marangon 2000). These spill-over infections cause higher morbidity 
in the host, ranging from mild to severe / lethal (Banks, Speidel et al. 2001). 
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1.7.1  Host specificity 
There are many factors determining whether a species can act as a host for an influenza A 
infection, the most obvious being sufficient contact between the host and the pathogen for 
infection to occur. This behavioral barrier makes some species more likely to become infected 
than others, and can be illustrated by the fact that since transmission of influenza A viruses 
occurs primarily via water, spill-over transmission to accidental hosts is mainly to species 
who share foraging areas with the dabbling ducks, such as waders and shorebirds (Olsen, 
Munster et al. 2006). For the virus to efficiently transmit between individuals of a novel host, 
the virus may have to change its tropism. In the case of influenza A viruses adapted to human 
and birds, it has been shown that the tropism is dependent on the linkage between receptor 
terminal SA to galactose (Gal). Influenza A viruses from humans show a preference for α2,6-
linked SA and Gal, while avian isolates have a higher affinity for receptors with a α2,3-
linkage (Rogers and Paulson 1983). In a laboratory setting it has been shown that isolating 
human adapted influenza viruses with the traditional method, of inoculating embryonated 
chicken eggs with virus containing material, reverts virus to α2,3 linkage preference (Katz, 
Naeve et al. 1987; Azzi, Bartolomei-Corsi et al. 1993; Widjaja, Ilyushina et al. 2006). Before 
reaching and binding to the epithelial cells, however, there are other host barriers such as 
mucus and alveolar macrophages to pass (Kuiken, Holmes et al. 2006). For example, in the 
secretions protecting the eyes and respiratory tract, different mucins containing SA are present 
that specifically bind and clear virus before they reach the epithelial cells. These mucins 
express different SA linkages in different species and also in different organ systems of the 
same species. Humans are better at clearing avian influenza A virus from the respiratory tract 
than from the eye since the mucins of the respiratory tracts are rich in α2,3-linked SA while 
the secretions of the eye are rich in α2,6 SA linkages. The situation is reversed in 
chimpanzees since their respiratory tract secretions are rich in α2,6-linked SA that make them 
partly resistant to infection by human influenza A virus (Olofsson, Kumlin et al. 2005). On 
the cellular receptor binding level there are major differences in SA linkage content between 
species, as well as differences within organ systems, and even between cells of the same 
organ systems. Taken together these differences may determine where, if at all, infection of 
the host may occur. Ducks that express α2,3-linked SA in the intestinal system are primarily 
affected by infection of the cells lining the intestinal tract (Ito, Couceiro et al. 1998). Within 
the human body α2,3-linked SA have been found to be predominant in the eye. In the 
respiratory system, α2,6 SA linkages  are predominant in the upper part whilst α2,3 linkages 
are present in the lower part, where influenza A virus has been shown to bind preferentially to 
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pneumocytes type II (Shinya, Hatta et al. 2005; van Riel, Munster et al. 2006). Although not 
predominant, α2,3 receptors are also found on ciliated cells of the upper respiratory tract 
(Matrosovich, Matrosovich et al. 2004). Human influenza virus targets non-ciliated cells that 
express α2,6-linked SA (Matrosovich, Matrosovich et al. 2004). This information might 
explain why there is only limited transmission of AIV to humans, why conjunctivitis has been 
a common symptom, and why the respiratory infections in humans are rare but severe when 
they occur (Fouchier, Schneeberger et al. 2004; Beigel, Farrar et al. 2005). It was previously 
thought that pigs (known to express both α2,3 and α2,6-linked SA in their respiratory 
epithelium) were unique in their potential to act as a mixing vessel host species, where 
pandemic virus strains could arise by the recombination of avian and human influenza virus 
strains infecting the same cell (Scholtissek, Burger et al. 1985; Ito, Couceiro et al. 1998). 
However, the finding that both humans and chickens harbor the different receptor types in 
different cells indicates that theoretically this could happen in other animal hosts as well 
(Matrosovich, Matrosovich et al. 2004; Kim, Ryu et al. 2005). Further research has shown 
that although avian influenza A virus strains preferentially bind α2,3-linked SA, a further 
refinement of specificity exists that differs between avian species. The refinement is based on 
recognition of differences in the inner part of the oligosaccharide receptor (Gambaryan, 
Yamnikova et al. 2005). Successful attachment to a cell does not necessarily imply that 
infection can occur since the virus must also be able to enter the cell and cause it to replicate 
its genetic material. In this process the internal genes of the virus are the determinants. It has 
been shown that there are host specific lineages of all the different internal genes indicating 
species adaptation and optimization of each gene (Baigent and McCauley 2003). Some of 
these differences have been analyzed in detail and found to be important. For example the 
PB2 gene of the virus polymerase complex plays a major role. Research has shown that in 
avian influenza A viruses the amino acid residue 627 of the PB2 protein differs from 
mammalian virus strains in that; avian virus strains have a glutamic acid at this site, whereas 
mammalian strains have a lysine and that this is of major importance for host range restriction 
(Subbarao, London et al. 1993). This difference has been associated with optimal replication 
at different temperatures. Human influenza strains replicate in an environment of about  
+33 ºC in the trachea while avian strains are adapted to replication in the intestinal tracts of 
birds at a temperature close to +41 ºC (Massin, van der Werf et al. 2001).  
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Fig 3. Illustration of the host range of influenza A virus, with the natural reservoir of influenza A virus, 
accidental hosts , and the subtypes that have been identified in the different groups. 
Kindly provided by Rebecca Rönnmark and Eric Gisaeus. 
 
 
It has also been shown experimentally that a change from glutamic acid to lysine at this site 
results in increased virulence for mice. The same change has also been described in H5N1 and 
H7N7 virus strains that have caused severe disease in humans (Hatta, Gao et al. 2001; 
Fouchier, Schneeberger et al. 2004). Once successful replication has taken place, the newly 
constructed virus must be released from the surface of the infected cell to invade new cells, 
and, like the HA, the NA of avian virus strains preferentially operates by cleaving the SA that 
are α2,3- linked, while human NAs prefer α2,6-linked SA (Baigent and McCauley 2003). 
Even if replication and release of new virions has been successful, there are still factors that 
determine whether or not the infection will remain localized in the organ of entry and if it will 
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prevail. First of all, the immunity of the host must be dealt with. As previously discussed; to 
hinder the host’s innate immune response to produce interferons, that put infected cells into an 
antiviral state, the influenza A virus’ NS1 polypeptide sequesters double stranded RNA from 
PKR so that the infected cell remains undetected. It has been shown that there are host 
specific differences in the NS1 gene of different strains, and the human NS1 gene is not 
optimal when introduced into mice strains (Palese 2004).  
The factors determining the ability of influenza A virus to produce systemic rather than 
localized infection in mammals are not fully understood (Kuiken, Holmes et al. 2006). In 
poultry, however, the ability of the virus to invade other organs depends on whether or not the 
HA of the virus can be cleaved by ubiquitous extra-cellular proteases or only by specific 
proteases that are only present in the respiratory and gastrointestinal tract. 
 
1.7.2  The human host 
Only subtypes H1N1 and H3N2 of influenza A virus follow an epidemiological pattern in 
humans and are considered endemic, though a H2N2 persisted for a long time. Influenza A 
viruses can be isolated somewhere in the world every month and the infection is sustained and 
perpetuated in the human population (Cox and Subbarao 2000). The virus strains that 
circulate in humans mainly cause respiratory disease and preferably infect the epithelium 
lining the airways. Progeny virus is shed in respiratory secretions and spread effectively by 
airborne droplets through coughing and sneezing, and person-to-person contact. Influenza 
epidemics occur mainly in the winter season, from October to April in the northern 
hemisphere, and from May to September in the southern hemisphere. In tropical regions 
influenza may occur throughout the year. The seasonal fluctuations (outside of the tropics) are 
probably a result of factors promoting virus survival and spread, like the fact that people 
spend more time indoors and that the humidity is low (Nicholson 1998).  
Considering the high infection rate of influenza during a seasonal outbreak, it may have a 
huge impact on national economies worldwide, depending on the severity of the epidemic. In 
temperate climates, 2-15 percent of the population becomes infected. Even during years with 
mild influenza epidemics, a large number of people die. In Sweden it is estimated that the 
number of casualties as a consequence of infection is between 1000 and 4500 depending on 
the strain. Many more are sick, and the cost for health care and sick leave is also high 
(Läkemedelsverket 2007). A spread of a subtype of influenza A virus, which the human 
population has not experienced before, and thus has no immunity against, may be rapid and 
cause concurrent outbreaks around the globe resulting in a pandemic. The severity of a 
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pandemic may vary with depending on the strain, and pandemic strains may behave 
differently to the seasonal epidemic strains. Treatment of influenza is mainly based on 
alleviating symptoms, although the development of NA inhibitors has created a way to 
shorten and perhaps limit disease if given early in the infection. Vaccination against influenza 
has been used for many years. In Sweden, elderly and groups at risk are encouraged to be 
vaccinated. Vaccination of school children, that are the principal spreaders of infection, have 
been tested in some countries. The main problem with vaccination is that the fast antigenic 
drift of influenza A virus renders the antibodies produced in response to earlier vaccinations 
obsolete. Therefore, in order to provide protection from disease, the vaccine has to be 
modified every year to adjust to the changes in the antigenic sites. Since the development and 
production of a vaccine takes months, qualified guesswork is used to decide which strains to 
include in order to match the strains of the coming season. Experimentally, AIV strains from 
wild birds do not replicate well in humans, and human strains do not replicate well in 
waterfowl (Hinshaw, Webster et al. 1983; Beare and Webster 1991). Until the outbreak in 
Hong Kong in 1997, the occurrence of transmission of avian strains was believed to be a rare 
event only causing conjunctivitis in the few affected cases (Katz 2003). However, a 
serological survey in rural China suggests that infection with avian subtypes has not been 
uncommon in people who have had close contact with domestic ducks and poultry (Shortridge 
1992). In recent years, outbreaks of HPAI strains that have evolved in poultry have occurred 
rather frequently. The symptoms of disease and the disease pattern have been variable 
depending of strain. In some cases, the disease has only caused conjunctivitis and mild 
influenza-like illness, with no evidence of human to human spread, such as in the Canadian 
H7N3 poultry outbreak of 2003 where two people were affected (Tweed, Skowronski et al. 
2004). In the Dutch H7N7 outbreak of 2003 conjunctivitis and influenza-like illness were also 
the most common symptoms, but there was also one case of fatal pneumonia. The Dutch 
outbreak affected at least 84 people although serological evidence suggests that as many as 
1000 people were infected (Enserink 2004). During the outbreak there was also evidence of 
human to human transmission in some cases (Fouchier, Schneeberger et al. 2004; Koopmans, 
Wilbrink et al. 2004). The H5N1 outbreaks in Hong Kong in 1997 and in Eurasia and Africa 
2006-2007 have caused disease in very few confirmed cases in comparison to the number of 
persons that have been exposed to sick birds. However, an epidemiological investigation 
suggests that there may be more undiagnosed cases (Thorson, Petzold et al. 2006). Low 
pathogenic H9N2 virus has been isolated in two children (Lin, Shaw et al. 2000) with mild 
influenza symptoms. H9N2 virus strains are suggested to be even more likely than H5N1 to 
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become the cause of a pandemic since the strains that circulate in domestic chicken and ducks 
worldwide have already acquired receptor specificity to prefer α2,6-linked SA (Li, Xu et al. 
2003; Choi, Ozaki et al. 2004).  
 
1.7.3  Other mammalian hosts 
Influenza A virus is able to infect several mammalian species and in some cases create 
endemic propagation. This has been shown both experimentally and in nature as described for 
the species below (Hinshaw, Webster et al. 1981). Highly pathogenic virus strains, such as the 
currently circulating H5N1 virus that originates from South East Asia, have shown an 
increased host range, and are able to infect many species that had previously not been 
considered vulnerable. Thus, the range of species-infectivity is heavily dependent on strain 
type. Below, mammals which can be infected with, and transmit influenza to other 
individuals, will be discussed. 
 
 Suidae 
Pigs are frequently infected by influenza A viruses, and there are specific swine-adapted 
strains. However, pigs are also susceptible both to human and avian adapted virus strains, 
which can be explained by the fact that the respiratory epithelium of pigs express both α2,3 
and α2,6-linked SA (Ito, Couceiro et al. 1998). Avian virus strains of different subtypes have 
been found in pigs on a number of occasions, such as H4N6, H3N3 and a H1H1 strain in 
Canada (Karasin, Brown et al. 2000; Karasin, West et al. 2004). Avian H1N1 has also been 
isolated in China where it caused a severe outbreak in pigs 1979-1980 and has remained in the 
pig population since that time (Schultz, Fitch et al. 1991; Guan, Shortridge et al. 1996). 
Several studies have also reported human H3N2 strains in pigs after the antigenic shift in the 
human population in 1968 (Ito and Kawaoka 2000). Further evidence show that both avian-
like and swine-like H1N1 strains circulated at the same time in pigs as well as human-like 
H3N2 and avian-like H9N2 (Scholtissek, Burger et al. 1983; Peiris, Guan et al. 2001). Taken 
together, the risk of a reassortant virus in such an environment is obvious, and several 
different variants have been found including reassortants between human-like H3N2 and 
avian-like HIN1 (Castrucci, Donatelli et al. 1993; Brown, Alexander et al. 1994; Brown, 
Harris et al. 1998). Humans may be infected by strains transmitted by pigs, as has been yet 
again obvious during the outbreak of a novel H1N1 in 2009, though direct transmission of 
swine-like H1N1 to humans has occurred previously, and has in some cases been fatal (Rota, 
Rocha et al. 1989; Claas, Kawaoka et al. 1994; WHO 2010).  
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Equidae 
Influenza A virus strains in horses are thought to be of avian origin. Different subtypes have 
been found to infect horses and antigenic drift creates distinct lineages within the subtypes. At 
least two subtypes have created stable lineages; H7N7 and H3N8 (Berg, Desselberger et al. 
1990; Guo, Wang et al. 1995; Oxburgh and Klingeborn 1999; Ozaki, Shimizu-Nei et al. 
2001). Some strains have been suggested to be recent introductions from wild birds (Guo, 
Wang et al. 1992).  
 
 Canidae 
Historically, canine species have not been a significant carrier of influenza virus. However, in 
2004, an outbreak in racing greyhounds was caused by a H3N8 influenza A virus, was found 
to be an equine influenza A virus variant that had adapted to spread in canines (Yoon, Cooper 
et al. 2005). This triggered further investigation among dog breeders in the U.S and found 
serologic evidence of common influenza infection, and also virus isolates (Payungporn, 
Crawford et al. 2008). During the recent outbreak in South East Asia a surveillance 
investigation has isolated H5N1 influenza virus from dogs and has also found that antibodies 
to H5N1 are common in Thai dogs suggesting that they have previously been infected (Butler 
2006). 
 
 Felidae 
Feline species were not considered particularly susceptible to influenza virus prior to the 
recent outbreak of avian influenza H5N1 that started in South East Asia in 2003. However, 
after 50 captive tigers and leopards became ill and died after having been fed infected chicken 
carcasses several investigations were performed (Keawcharoen, Oraveerakul et al. 2004; 
Amonsin, Payungporn et al. 2006). It was shown that there was not only direct transmission 
from the contaminated food but also probable transmission between tigers 
(Thanawongnuwech, Amonsin et al. 2005). Experimental infection of domestic cats has 
shown that cats infected with the H5N1 highly pathogenic strain develop lethal systemic 
infection and excrete virus in both the respiratory and digestive tract secretions. The cats in 
the experiment could also infect each other (Kuiken, Rimmelzwaan et al. 2004; 
Rimmelzwaan, van Riel et al. 2006). In Europe, cats have also been found to be infected by 
the H5N1 virus in areas where there have been outbreaks in wild birds (ECDC 2006). 
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 Mustelidae 
Mink and ferrets have been found to be susceptible to influenza A virus and have been used in 
experiments since 1933 (Smith 1933; Okazaki, Yanagawa et al. 1983). When infected with 
human-type influenza virus, the symptoms displayed are very similar to those of humans: 
respiratory symptoms like sneezing and coughing, decreased apetite with following weight 
loss, lethargy and fever (Bodewes, Rimmelzwaan et al. 2010). As a disease model, ferrets can 
be argued to be the best to mimic human disease, though mice tend to be more commonly 
used simply because ferrets are much more difficult to handle (Maher and DeStefano 2004). 
Intranasal inoculation of the new A(H1N1)2009 from different strains induced very different 
clinical signs depending on the strain used, varying from subclinical infection to disinterest in 
food, fever, lethargy and severe weight loss. Mink have also been found to be naturally 
infected by avian influenza A virus of the subtype H10N4 during an outbreak in farmed mink 
in Blekinge, Sweden (Klingeborn, Englund et al. 1985). Further investigation revealed that 
the virus strain causing the outbreak in the Swedish mink was most likely of wild bird origin. 
Although the virus was very similar to avian virus strains, it was adapted to spread in-between 
mink (Berg, Englund et al. 1990; Englund and Hard af Segerstad 1998).  
 
 Pinnipedia and Cetacea 
Infection of seals with influenza A virus has been reported on several occasions, and there is 
good reason to believe this is not an uncommon event. In 1979-80, seals off Cape Cod in 
eastern United States died of hemorrhagic pneumonia (Geraci, St Aubin et al. 1982). The 
causative agent of disease was found to be influenza A virus of the subtype H7N7. The virus 
contained avian-like genes, but behaved as a mammalian strain (Webster, Hinshaw et al. 
1981). During the autopsies and handling of experimentally infected seals, people handling 
the animals developed conjunctivitis from influenza infection (Webster, Geraci et al. 1981). In 
a subsequent outbreak among seals during the season 1982-83, another even more avian-like 
virus was recovered from seals suffering from pneumonia. This virus belonged to the H4N5 
subtype (Hinshaw, Bean et al. 1984). Further surveys of seals in the area have also found 
H3N3 virus strains to be present in seals (Callan, Early et al. 1995; Ohishi, Kishida et al. 
2004). Seals have also been shown to be infected by influenza B virus of human origin 
(Osterhaus, Rimmelzwaan et al. 2000). 
Whales have been found infected on several occasions, but difficulties in surveillance of these 
animals and high costs has made it difficult to determine the frequency of occurrence of these  
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events, though it does not seem common (Ridgway 1979; Hinshaw, Bean et al. 1986; Nielsen, 
Clavijo et al. 2001). Analysis show the most probable route of introduction has been directly 
from birds to the aquatic mammals (Hinshaw, Bean et al. 1986; Mandler, Gorman et al. 
1990). Investigations of the receptor specificity of the SA in whale and seal lungs showed the 
presence of α2,3-linked SA and only a weak association with α2,6- linked SA (Lvov, Zdanov 
et al. 1978; Ito, Kawaoka et al. 1999; Matrosovich, Tuzikov et al. 2000). This might explain 
why these seals and whales are susceptible to infection by avian virus strains.  
 
1.7.4  Influenza A virus in domestic fowl 
As previously discussed, influenza A virus may enter into domestic bird populations as low 
pathogenic strains that only cause mild disease. Subtypes H5 and H7, however, may evolve 
into highly pathogenic strains. The fast mutation rate that is displayed in domestic fowl is 
probably due to the extremely high propagation rates in dense flocks.  
Influenza A virus causes a wide spectrum of symptoms in reared birds, from mild illness to a 
highly contagious and fatal disease resulting in severe epidemics. Highly pathogenic avian 
influenza is characterized by severe illness, rapid death and a mortality in the affected 
populations that approaches 100 percent within 72 hours. Many different species of domestic 
birds including chickens, turkeys, quail and ostriches are susceptible to epidemics of rapidly 
fatal influenza (Capua and Mutinelli 2001; Perez, Webby et al. 2003). The main difference 
between infection with highly pathogenic virus strains and low pathogenic virus strains is 
systemic contra localized infection, the cleavage of the HA by ubiquitous proteases that 
expunges the restriction to cells in the respiratory tract (Suarez and Schultz-Cherry 2000). 
Several mutations may add to the pathogenicity of strains causing HPAI but the accumulation 
of basic amino acids at the cleavage site is diagnostic for disease outbreaks.  
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Fig 4. Illustration of localized LPAI infection vs systemic HPAI infection. 
Adapted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: [Nature Reviews Microbiology] “Influenza: lessons 
from past pandemics, warnings from current incidents” copyright 2005 
 
 
Direct or indirect contact of domestic flocks with wild migratory waterfowl has been 
implicated as a cause of epizootics, but spread between farms during an outbreak is most 
likely caused by the movement of people and the transport of goods (Webster, Bean et al. 
1992; Gilbert, Chaitaweesub et al. 2006). Outbreaks of HPAI are often difficult to control 
since the virus can persist and remain active for some time in the environment, and because it 
is highly transmissible. In areas with dense poultry populations and or limited resources for 
surveillance and control, such as Mexico, South East Asia and Africa, outbreaks are even 
harder to contain.  
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1.7.5  Influenza A virus in wild birds  
It is widely accepted that all influenza virus strains infecting mammalian species originate 
from wild birds (Webster, Bean et al. 1992). All 16 HA and 9 NA subtypes been detected in 
isolates from avian species, and the evidence for the existence of a wild bird reservoir is 
strong throughout the world (Alexander 2000; Fouchier, Munster et al. 2005). It is only on 
Antarctica researchers have failed to isolate virus, even if serological evidence was found 
(Wallensten, Munster et al. 2006). On all other continents, birds have been shown to carry 
infectious AIV (Morgan and Westbury 1981; Austin and Webster 1993). However, most 
studies have taken place in developed countries and the situation in Africa, South America 
and parts of Asia is much less explored.  
Low pathogenic influenza A virus strains have been isolated from more than 105 species from 
26 different families of birds and almost all isolates come from the families Anseriformes and 
to a lesser extent Charadriformes and Laridae (Stallknecht and Shane 1988). These families 
include birds such as ducks, geese, swans, waders and gulls; although different species 
evolutionarily speaking, they share the trait of being adapted to life in an aquatic environment. 
Isolations of low pathogenic virus strains from pure land-dwelling birds are on the contrary 
rare.  
 
 Propagation 
Dabbling ducks are very susceptible to, and easily become infected with, avian strains of 
influenza A virus through the intake of contaminated food and water. The virus remains active 
after passing through the low pH of the duck gizzard and infects in the cells lining the 
intestinal tract as well as the cells of the pulmonary epithelium (Shortridge 1992).  
During the period of infection, large amounts of virus of up to 10
8 
EID50 is shed in the duck 
feces, usually for about seven days, but shedding has been recorded for as long as 21 days 
(Webster, Yakhno et al. 1978; Kida, Yanagawa et al. 1980). Tracheal shedding also occur, 
though this route is probably more relevant where the social behavior of certain species makes 
fecal-oral transmission difficult (Ellstrom, Latorre-Margalef et al. 2008). The fact that 
infected birds shed high amounts of influenza A virus via fecal excretions implies that birds 
living in aquatic environments will contaminate the water where they live. Influenza A virus 
of different subtypes has been isolated in concentrations of up to 10
2,8
 EID50 /ml of water 
from un-concentrated lake water in lakes where wild ducks congregate (Hinshaw, Webster et 
al. 1979; Ito, Okazaki et al. 1995). Since the virus remains viable for some time in water, it 
permits transmission to other birds in the area through ingestion of contaminated water. 
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Influenza A virus strains were even recovered from lake water for about a month after the 
birds in the lake had migrated south for the winter, indicating that lakes may be a source of 
infection for other birds for a long time. 
The species preference of influenza A virus is likely to be determined by the mode of 
transmission, i.e. by the fecal-oral route via water. Since virus is shed by infected birds in 
high quantities into an environment where it can survive for an extended time, the feeding and 
social behavior of the reservoir species makes it likely that susceptible individuals are 
exposed to the pathogen. Species that feed in shallow, calm waters, where influenza A virus is 
found in the highest concentrations, run the highest risk of becoming infected. Other species 
belonging to the Anseriformes, like swans and geese, graze to a larger extent on land on 
pastures and agricultural fields, which may lead to less efficient transmission though they are 
equally susceptible to the virus as their dabbling cousins. Scavenger species, such as raptors 
that may feed on diseased birds, are also likely to become infected, but not to take part in 
efficient transmission as they do not dwell in water.  
 
 
 
Fig 5. Overview of the major migratory flyways. Many birds who do not normally share biotope encounter one 
another during migration. Courtesy of Wetlands International, www.wetlands.org 
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The populations of Anatidae, Charadriformes and Laridae species in the world are large, the 
Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) population by itself is estimated to 27 million birds (Kaleta, 
Hergarten et al. 2005). Many populations present in different areas are also connected, as 
these birds travel over vast distances and congregate in large numbers at staging sites during 
migrations (Arzel, Elmberg et al. 2006). Wild duck populations could therefore be 
hypothesized to support the perpetuation of even short-lived infections such as influenza, as 
there are enough susceptible individuals at any given time. The minimum population to 
support the perpetuation of the measles virus has been estimated to be 500,000 humans, and 
although the attack rate of influenza A virus in ducks might be lower, the population size of 
ducks is probably still large enough to compensate for this (Nathanson 2005). Also, certain 
aspects of duck demography and ecology might make the minimum population needed even 
smaller. First of all, the populations of ducks have high turnover rates. In Mallards about one 
third of the population is replaced each year, implying that this proportion is immunologically 
naïve (Bentz 1985; Gunnarsson, Elmberg et al. 2008). As prevalence of influenza A virus has 
been shown to be higher in juvenile than in adult birds, the input of juvenile, and thus 
immunologically naïve, birds is most likely of key importance for upholding the number of 
susceptible birds in the population.  
One of the enigmas of influenza A virus ecology is how so many subtypes can circulate in the 
wild bird populations and persist from year to year, when some of these subtypes are isolated 
rarely, and since the prevalence in the studied bird populations differ greatly between studied 
species, place, and time of year. While some subtypes are frequently isolated, others have 
been isolated only rarely in specific places or in specific species, such as the H13 and H16 
subtypes that have almost exclusively been isolated from gulls. 
A clear picture of the enzootic cycle of influenza A virus in wild birds does not exist. More 
research is needed to elucidate the different stages involved in the interaction between the 
virus, the host and the environment. Hopefully, many of these variations and peculiarities will 
be explained in the future, when more data on the prevalence of different subtypes in different 
species and at different locations is available. At the present time, however,  the explanations 
remain elusive.  
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 Pathogenisis and immunity 
It is commonly believed that all birds are susceptible to influenza A virus infection, although 
some species are more resistant than others. A number of variables can affect the clinical 
outcome of an infection; subtype, strain, host species and individual all play a role deciding 
the severity of the disease, which may range from non-pathogenic to lethal (Laudert, 
Sivanandan et al. 1993). Within the duck family there are many different species, and they 
may show different responses to the same infection (Suarez and Schultz-Cherry 2000).  
Infections by low pathogenic strains in ducks have traditionally been considered benign, as 
there are no evident clinical signs of disease. Though there is indication of coupling infection 
to a decreased body mass, aquatic birds do not appear to be severely affected by the disease 
and the infection does not seem to limit an infected bird’s interaction with other birds or the 
environment (Latorre-Margalef, Gunnarsson et al. 2009). Nor does infection with low 
pathogenic strains seem to limit mallard capability for migration flights that could transport 
the virus long distances to new susceptible flocks, though the contrary has been shown for 
swans (van Gils, Munster et al. 2007). However, symptoms may be hard to detect. It is 
difficult to evaluate if the birds are completely unaffected or actually become sick in a subtle 
way. Few studies have been conducted in this area, but histopathological signs of mild 
pneumonia have been shown in ducks, even though no other signs of disease were evident 
(Cooley, Van Campen et al. 1989). Highly pathogenic viruses behave differently, however, 
and strains that are highly pathogenic for chickens may cause milder disease and different 
signs of disease in other species (Perkins and Swayne 2003). They may even show no signs of 
disease in some more resistant species of ducks and gulls (Alexander, Allan et al. 1978; 
Cooley, Van Campen et al. 1989; Perkins and Swayne 2002; Kishida, Sakoda et al. 2005). 
Due to the lack of evident effects on the birds’ health status, ducks and gulls may act as 
carriers of some highly pathogenic strains. It is not known whether highly pathogenic 
influenza will revert to low pathogenicity in ducks, or whether HPAI can be perpetuated in 
nature indefinitely.  
Studies using experimental infection have also shown that ducks may be re-infected with the 
same strain after two months indicating that the protection of acquired immunity is poor 
(Kida, Yanagawa et al. 1980). Using a recapture scheme for wild ducks and sampling the 
same duck at regular intervals has shown re-infection at even shorter intervals (Latorre-
Margalef, Gunnarsson et al. 2009). Other bird species such as chicken, pheasant, turkey and 
quail mount a humoral response with high levels of IgM and IgY production (Suarez and 
Schultz-Cherry 2000). However, in large-scale studies, juvenile ducks are found to be infected 
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with influenza A virus more frequently than adult birds, indicating some sort of acquired 
immunity or improved immune response (Webster, Bean et al. 1992). Also, recent studies on 
poultry have shown a strong cross-immunity to highly pathogenic variants after vaccination 
with heterologous strains and that previous infection with a low pathogenic strain provides 
protection from disease also if the low pathogenic strain subsequently evolves into a highly 
pathogenic strain (van der Goot, de Jong et al. 2003; Fereidouni, Starick et al. 2009). 
 
 Evolution 
Further evidence that wild birds constitute a reservoir for influenza A virus comes from 
studies on viral evolution, which have shown limited evolution in wild ducks over time. It has 
therefore been suggested that influenza A virus exists in an evolutionary stasis in the reservoir 
species (Bean, Schell et al. 1992; Webster, Bean et al. 1992). This suggestion is supported by 
analysis of strains recovered from wild ducks that have been preserved in museums since the 
early 20
th
 century, which show almost no antigenic drift when compared to modern avian 
strains (Reid, Fanning et al. 2003). However, genetic studies on sequences from the 
contemporary gene pool show a mutation rate that is in contrast to the historical findings 
(Chen and Holmes 2006). It has also been found that co-infections of different influenza virus 
strains are detected less frequently in ducks than in other species, suggesting that host adapted 
strains prevent co-infection by other strains (Sharp, Kawaoka et al. 1997). The Anseriformes 
species is also very old, and have existed for millions of years, during which time influenza 
virus has obviously been able to adapt to the host in ways yet to be described (Shortridge 
1992). This situation is very different from the situation when influenza A virus is introduced 
into mammals, an evolutionarily much younger and ill-adapted host, and avian strains that are 
introduced into new host species are evolving at high rates (Zhou, Shortridge et al. 1999).  
However, even though influenza A virus in the wild bird reservoir has been said to be in 
“evolutionary stasis”, there have been slight changes over time. For one, different genetic 
lineages of influenza A virus have evolved in bird populations are distinctly geographically 
separated. Avian influenza A virus strains of the Americas can thus be separated from those in 
the rest of the world (von Hoyningen-Huene and Scholtissek 1983; Donis, Bean et al. 1989; 
Schafer, Kawaoka et al. 1993). A clear ecological answer to why it is so is not easy to 
provide, considering that summer breeding birds of Alaska spend their winters on six different 
continents and North American pintails birds along the West American flyway have been 
found to cross the strait to the Eurasian side (Miller, Takekawa et al. 2005; Winker, 
McCracken et al. 2007). Genetic exchange between the continents has also been shown to 
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occur, if at low rate (Schafer, Kawaoka et al. 1993; Makarova, Kaverin et al. 1999; Liu, 
Okazaki et al. 2004; Wallensten, Munster et al. 2005). Thus, the reason for such a limited 
exchange of AIV between the continents remains unclear. Knowledge on the interaction and 
spread of pathogens between different flyways and continents may be crucial in estimating the 
spread of AIV between different areas of the world and pre-pandemic planning.  
 
1.8 Implications for future introductions of AIV 
Low pathogenic influenza A virus strains do not seem to hinder dabbling ducks from 
migrating. Thus, these virus strains may be carried over large distances by the birds in a relay 
pattern where one bird carries the virus a short distance and another carries it further. Until the 
present outbreak of HPAI H5N1 that started in Asia it was not believed that wild birds could 
be infected with highly pathogenic virus strains and still perform long distance migrations. As 
some species of ducks have shown a high resistance to these strains this belief has had to be 
reviewed. After the HPAI H5N1 had somehow been exported to Russia, Europe and Africa in 
2006, sudden satellite outbreaks in wild birds showed that transport of highly pathogenic 
strains by wild birds is a reality. Knowledge of influenza ecology and epidemiology thus 
becomes a key factor in the pre-pandemic work.  
Elementary strategy planning in any battle has one basic goal: Do not to get caught off guard. 
The ability to foresee an outbreak allows pandemic control systems to focus containment on 
relevant areas in advance. Farm animals, for example, are the common interface between 
zoonotic diseases in the wild and humans. Primary introduction of influenza A virus into 
poultry and domestic animal holdings are likely due to fecal contamination by wild birds 
either directly by contamination of the holdings or indirectly through contaminated water 
supplies or feed. Holdings where wild birds and domestic birds share the same habitat due to 
agricultural practices are at the highest risk for outbreaks, suggesting that wild bird 
transmission is the most common route (Gilbert, Chaitaweesub et al. 2006). When a subtype 
which can be deemed a risk for humans is detected, such as the highly pathogenic H5N1, 
knowledge of how it may travel with migratory birds provides an opportunity for quick 
outbreak control. If a problematic subtype is suspected to arrive to a specific area during a 
specific period, regulatory government authorities may take preventive action, for example by 
issuing grazing restrictions for farm animals to limit their exposure to the expected pathogen. 
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2 Aims of this thesis 
 
In this thesis, I place emphasis on areas which may be of importance to influenza research and 
in the anticipation of a novel introduction to humans.  
 
- To investigate AIV ecology and epidemiology to increase our knowledge of how low 
pathogenic virus behaves in its natural setting, to facilitate the anticipation of new 
outbreaks.  
 
- To describe how the natural carriers are affected by infection and to investigate 
whether they can be expected to behave like healthy individuals. 
 
- To investigate alternative methods of virus isolation 
 
- To investigate novel factors that may affect the AIV reservoir in nature, and to provide 
information about how this may influence future human pandemics. 
 
32 
 
33 
 
3 Methodological considerations  
 
Unfortunately, science is not perfect. Many techniques used in the laboratory are highly 
specific, where biology in general is not. It is constantly changing, and it is only after a 
change has been identified that we can adjust our methods accordingly. In this sense we will 
always be one step behind, unknowingly, until the novelty is brought to light. Some tests give 
a qualitative result which must be subjected to interpretation. Also statistical analysis of 
results can differ in quality, and the model algorithm may not be perfect even when it is the 
best available.  
 
3.1  Screening for influenza A virus: RNA-isolation and virus detection 
The screening of patient samples for the presence of influenza A virus using reverse 
transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) has been evaluated in many studies and 
been found to have a high specificity and sensitivity (Smith, Mock et al. 2003; Stone, 
Burrows et al. 2004; Hindiyeh, Levy et al. 2005). Some studies have also evaluated methods 
more adapted to suit the detection of AIV strains specifically (Fouchier, Bestebroer et al. 
2000; Spackman, Senne et al. 2003; Spackman, Senne et al. 2003; Cattoli, Drago et al. 2004; 
Lee and Suarez 2004; Schlingemann, Leijon et al. 2010). The fecal samples collected for 
these studies were screened using RT-PCR. In brief, RNA was isolated from the samples 
using commercially available RNA-isolation kits according to the manufacturers’ instructions, 
both manually and by the use of automated procedures. Subsequently, a reverse transcriptase 
(RT)-step creating a cDNA amplicon was carried out. Influenza A virus RNA was detected 
using primers directed at conserved regions of the M-gene of the influenza virus, and 
amplified using real time PCR technology allowing for quantification analyses and 
minimizing the risks of cross-contamination of samples caused by post amplification sample 
handling (Spackman, Senne et al. 2003). The TaqMan method uses a probe that is designed to 
bind in between the nucleotide sequence determined by two primers. When the polymerase 
replication takes place, the probe is cleaved and fluorescent light is emitted. We chose this 
method of real-time PCR before the alternative, SYBR-green, which uses a dye that binds 
unspecifically to double stranded DNA. When the PCR product determined by the primers is 
amplified and hybridized the dye binds and emits light. Both these methods can be used to 
measure the amount of the desired PCR products as the amount of light emitted is 
proportional to the PCR product. The amount of nucleotide template in the original sample 
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can also be determined, since the more template molecules present at the beginning of the 
reaction, the fewer cycles it takes to reach the point at which the fluorescent signal is first 
recorded to reach an exponential amplification phase. Using the TaqMan approach with the 
combination of specific primers and a specific probe is more specific than using SYBR-green 
technology. The SYBR-green method might have an advantage when it comes to detecting 
different variants of influenza A virus as it may allow for the amplification of strains with 
more variations in the nucleotide sequence. It is, however, less specific due to the fact that 
unspecific binding may occur to non-specific reaction products, including primer-dimers, and 
we have chosen the TaqMan technology to minimize the risk of false-positive signals. 
 
3.2  Isolation of influenza A virus 
Virus isolation was performed on all samples that were positive by RT-PCR. Egg culturing 
was used since it works better than culturing on existing cell lines (Nicholson 1998). Isolation 
of influenza viruses is traditionally performed by inoculation of ECE’s with material 
containing viral particles. This method has been widely established as the gold standard since 
it was first introduced in the 1930’s (Bull 1943). The WHO has issued guidelines for national 
surveillance programs in which embryonated chicken eggs are suggested as the preferred 
method of isolating influenza virus from animal samples (Stöhr 2002). Influenza viruses grow 
well in these vessels, but it is suspected that, like most virus isolation techniques, it introduces 
mutations and that there may be some difference between the original sample and the isolate 
on which the investigation is performed.  In these studies, 200μl of the original samples was 
inoculated into the allantoic cavities of 11 day old ECE’s. The allantoic fluid was harvested 
after 2 days and influenza A virus was detected by using hemagglutination assays with 
chicken erythrocytes. In 1951, Hirst discovered that red blood cells in suspension fail to 
sediment and instead agglutinate forming a lattice. Since then the hemagglutination 
phenomenon has been used for the detection and characterization of influenza virus 
(Nicholson 1998). If no influenza A virus was detected, the allantoic fluid was passaged once 
again in embryonated hens’ eggs for one more isolation attempt. Not all of the PCR- positive 
samples could be isolated, indicating that there are limitations of this method. These 
limitations could be due to different reasons. Virus replication might require a certain amount 
of virus in the original sample, or the virus might not be able grow in the egg, or perhaps the 
RNA fragments amplified were not part of functional viruses. Another limitation when using 
egg culturing is that it may not always propagate all strains present in a sample. Studies have 
shown that more than one influenza virus strain might be present in fecal samples (Hinshaw, 
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Bean et al. 1980). Multiple strains cannot be told apart in the initial PCR step, and when 
grown on eggs, one strain might be better suited for replication and dominate the culture, in 
which case the other strain may not be detected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3  Characterization of influenza A virus 
Two main branches of techniques have been used to characterize influenza A viruses: 
serological testing using specific antibodies that can distinguish between subtypes of 
influenza surface proteins, and molecular analysis of the genes, which is more cumbersome 
but also more specific. 
Courtesy of Dr J.Katz 
Influenza: propagation, quantification, and storage. 
Curr Protoc Microbiol. 2006 Dec;Chapter 15:Unit 15G.1. 
 
Fig 6. Virus isolation: Inoculation of sample 
material into the allantoic cavity of an 
embryonating chicken egg. 
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3.3.1  Hemagglutination inhibition and sequencing 
The virus isolates found by egg culture were characterized to HA-subtype with a 
hemagglutination inhibition assay, using chicken erythrocytes and subtype-specific 
hyperimmune rabbit antisera raised against all known HA subtypes and by RT-PCR and 
sequencing. Virus isolates were characterized to NA-subtype by using RT-PCR and 
sequencing. RT-PCR was performed using primers for conserved non-coding regions for all 
genes (Hoffmann, Stech et al. 2001). PCR products were purified from agarose gels and 
sequenced using a sequencing robot.  
 
3.3.2  Genomic analysis and phylogenetic trees 
Phylogenetic trees were constructed in paper I to show the relationship between different 
subtypes and different strains of influenza A virus. 
Alignment was performed with the Clustal W method in the Bioedit 7.0.0 software. From 
these alignments, neighbour joining trees for each gene and for each subtype of the surface 
proteins were constructed (H3, H6, H8 and N1, N3, N8, respectively) using the Mega3 
software with Kimura-2 parameter (Kumar, Tamura et al. 2004).  
When the trees were too large to overview with major clusters of sequences from one 
sampling site, representative sequences were selected from each major subclade of each tree, 
to represent the phylogenetic span. These representative American and Eurasian sequences 
were then merged and aligned with the full-length sequences from our isolates, creating 
uniform alignments containing 21 sequences each, and these alignments were then used to 
build neighbour joining trees, each tree with 500 bootstrap replicates, to illustrate the 
phylogenetic and geographic relationships. 
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4 Results and discussion 
 
Below follows, in a brief manner, the results from the original papers included in this thesis. 
They will be discussed in the context of the current knowledge of avian- pandemic- and 
human influenza. For further information regarding details and methodology, the reader is 
advised to consult the original papers. 
 
I. Reassortment between American and Eurasian Influenza Virus from waterfowl in 
Beringia. 
Eurasian and North American AIV strains are phylogenetically distinct from each other, 
indicating a geographic constraint for the virus to move freely between the continents. 
However, it is not obvious why it should be so, considering the proximity of the continents at 
Bering strait. This area is a major breeding area for dabbling ducks (Northern Pintails) and 
that birds from the Australasian flyway may breed on the Alaskan side, sharing foraging 
grounds with their north American counterparts and vice versa (Winker, McCracken et al. 
2007). In paper I, it is refuted that AIV prevalence is lower in the Beringia region than other 
breeding areas for dabbling ducks, though also in this study, as in several previous ones in the 
same area, there is no evidence of any virus spreading from one continent to the other (Liu, 
Okazaki et al. 2004; Glaser, Zamarin et al. 2006). The only genes clustering with sequences 
from the other side of the strait were Eurasian derived genes on the Alaskan side, but which 
have been recorded previously several times along the North American flyway. Though this 
may be due to a genetic spill-over over the strait which has established itself along the west 
coast of North America or an introduction from another source cannot be concluded from this 
study alone. Prevalence, however, is similar to what has been found in previous studies in 
other parts of the world, provided the focus is being put on the relevant species. Other studies 
have shown a much lower prevalence in this area, which may be due to several factors. In 
some cases, different species of birds were pooled in the calculations, allowing non-carrier 
species to dilute the actual prevalence in the relevant species, and many studies were 
conducted with crude field technology without the possibility to store samples frozen or treat 
them with RNA-stabilizing agents (Winker, McCracken et al. 2007). During the collection of 
the samples for this study, travelling with a large ship off-coast allowed the privilege of a lab 
and an ultrafreeze holding -80ºC where all samples were treated and stored within 2 hours of 
being collected.  
38 
 
In conclusion, the reason for the genetic separation of AIV in North America and Eurasia 
remains unclear. How stable this separation is also unknown, as is any potential factor that 
could potentially disrupt this balance. It would be prudent to remain active with the AIV 
surveillance of the Beringia region and investigate the movement of AIV along the migratory 
flyways also in the future. Knowledge of AIV ecology and its epidemiological patterns in the 
natural host may be key factors in the anticipation of future pandemics and pre-pandemic 
planning. 
 
II. Mallard or chicken? A comparative study of influenza isolation on embryonated eggs 
from different species. 
This article addresses the issue of mutations being introduced during virus isolation. The fact 
that human influenza needs to adapt to grow well in chicken eggs is widely known. Using 
chicken eggs for isolation of influenza has become commonplace since its first introduction in 
the 1930’s, and the selection process for human influenza has been well described. Foremost, 
the virus needs to switch from its original preference for α2,6-linked SA to α2,3-linkage 
specificity. However, though this is the most well described difference between two species, 
there are others that have yet to be described. There is little known about the difference in 
selection pressure between different bird species, though its existence is undeniable and the 
effects are obvious. On numerous occasions have LPAI infected poultry farms in which the 
virus has undergone a dramatic phenotypic change to HPAI. As this is no single-event 
phenomenon, but rather quite common, at least when it comes to subtypes H5 and H7, there is 
obviously a specific pressure for the virus to change also after spread within the avian 
kingdom. 
In this project, it was hypothesized that if this pressure on the virus is not of immunological 
origin it may still exist in the most common isolation vessel for AIV; the embryonated 
chicken egg. Though it was found that mallard eggs consistently yielded higher titres of virus 
than the chicken eggs, the mutation rate was similar, if not higher, than that found when 
passaging the same virus in chicken eggs. In the mallard eggs, the two viruses changed one 
and two aa in the primary isolation respectively, and no further mutations could be detected in 
the subsequent 7 passages. The same viruses behaved slightly different in chicken eggs. Both 
viruses changed one aa each, but one of the viruses maintained wild-type configuration for 
two passages before switching one aa in passage 3. Despite the fact that the material in this 
project is too small to conclude differences in the evolutionary rate depending on which 
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species of egg is used for propagation, there is no indication that mallard eggs would produce 
progeny virus that is more similar to the wild-type than chicken eggs.  
 
III. Influenza Virus in a Natural Host, the Mallard: Experimental Infection Data 
Discerning the virus-host interaction in the reservoir species is key information in the 
understanding of AIV ecology. The distinction “low pathogenic” or “highly pathogenic” are 
terms derived from the response to infection in chickens, where low pathogenic virus induce 
easilt detectable symptoms like depression, ruffled feathers, conjunctivitis, swelling and 
clotting of infraorbital sinuses, and subcutaneous emphysema. An autopsy of LPAI infected 
chickens will find pathologic signs in almost every organ. Highly pathogenic is commonly 
fatal with a mortality rate in chickens close to 100%. Survivability is very low. In contrast, 
mallards infected with LPAI show no obvious physical sign of disease and have been 
considered subclinical carriers of AIV. Whether they feel ill or not is hard to discern however, 
though feeling “under the weather” may well affect behavior and migration pattern. In this 
article, we address two questions highly important for the field of influenza virus ecology, i.e. 
(1) “Are the natural hosts of low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses affected by 
infection?” and (2) “Can the natural hosts of LPAI viruses be immune to re-infections?”. To 
this purpose, we experimentally inoculated “wild-type” mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) with 
LPAI isolates from wild congeners. Inoculation was performed in the esophagus to mimic the 
natural oro-fecal cycle known to occur in this species. The novelty of our approach was to use 
telemetry to evaluate the effects of infection. Six juvenile mallards kept in individual cages 
and equipped with subcutaneous transponders and temperature loggers were monitored for 
body temperature, heart rate and activity before and after challenge with a LPAI H7N7 virus. 
Although the ducks remained alert with no modification of heart rate and activity, we 
recorded a moderate temperature increase in four ducks on the day they started shedding 
virus. This result suggests that LPAI strains may have a sub-clinical impact on their natural 
waterbird hosts, which may be of particular importance in the wild when these costs have to 
be balanced against other expenses such as growth, molt, or migration. The second originality 
of our study was to re-inoculate the ducks, first with a homologous subtype (the same H7N7 
isolate) and then with a heterologous subtype (H5N2 isolate), to compare the successive viral 
shedding patterns and detect any immunity to re-infection. We found that mallards re-
inoculated with a homologous LPAI subtype three weeks after primo-infection were immune 
to re-infection. Interestingly, immunity to re-infection by a heterologous subtype was also 
observed in five of the six studied birds, indicating that, in the wild, the transmission 
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dynamics of the different virus subtypes are not independent. Inter-individual variability was 
illustrated by the fact that the re-infection with H5 generated virus replicated in one duck.  
Our findings that LPAI viruses may have ecological costs for their natural hosts and that 
immunity to heterologous re-infection exists in wild birds are of significant importance. 
Indeed, LPAI transmission dynamics in water birds may be modified if infected birds change 
their behavior and if herd immunity exists in the population. Transmission models should 
therefore include these factors, and more studies in a natural environment conducted to 
discern whether this variable is associated with an ecological cost. On a broader scale, our 
study demonstrates the utility of using telemetry to study diseases in animals.  
 
IV. Environmental levels of the antiviral drug oseltamivir induce development of   
resistance mutation H274Y in influenza A(H1N1) virus. 
Antiviral drugs and passive immunization are the only options available to reduce an 
influenza infection once it has taken hold. Where logistical problems hinder an effective use 
of passive immunization, only antiviral drugs, which are not subtype specific, can be 
realistically used. Oseltamivir is currently the most effective agent against influenza A, and as 
it sterically blocks the active site of the NA protein, it is insensitive to the HA subtype of the 
virus. It is a cornerstone in the defense against new pandemics, to which the human 
population has poor resistance. However, as the active metabolite oseltamivir carboxylate 
(OC) is highly stable and is not degraded in purification plants for sewage water, low levels of 
OC can be detected in surface water where dabbling ducks forage. In this paper, we show how 
an OC-sensitive virus mutates under the pressure of a low level OC environment and becomes 
resistant. OC-sensitive virus was inoculated in mallards negative in AIV screening both in 
PCR and ELISA tests. The only water source was spiked with OC, and the trial was run in 
three sets, with different OC levels. Virus propagation to downstream generations was 
allowed through contact after introducing naïve mallard to the infected ones, to mimic natural 
transmission. Virus samples were collected on a daily basis, and known resistance mutations 
were detected through sequencing of the NA-gene. Resistance was verified by phenotypical 
analysis of NA activity over an OC gradient parallel with wild-type virus. 
It could be concluded that levels of OC that can be detected in surface water today give rise to 
sporadic resistant strains, and at increased OC levels the resistant sub-species quickly 
becomes dominant. When exposing the mallards to dabbling water containing 100µg/L OC, 
only resistant virus could be detected after two passages. 
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Spread of OC resistant strains in nature increases the threat to human health from influenza A 
viruses. If the next pandemic is derived from a virus already resistant to OC, a significant part 
of the pandemic countermeasures of many countries worldwide will be rendered useless. In 
the past decade, the use of OC has increased steadily, and the effects on the environment and 
the influenza reservoir are still unknown. Continued surveillance in wild birds as a measure to 
understand the resistance situation in nature, and its development over time is thus of great 
importance. It would also be prudent to, in the light of these results, implement strategies to 
lower environmental levels of OC.  
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Concluding remarks  
 
Future introductions of influenza viruses to humans may present us with other types of 
problems than what we have been forced to deal with previously. All the answers to how to 
act in the future may not lie in the past. Nature changes constantly, with or without our help. 
No matter the cause, they are all variables needed to be taken into account when planning for 
future outbreak control measures. In preparation for the next pandemic, it is of vital 
importance to understand the ecology and epidemiology of avian influenza. As previously 
described in the introduction, it is in the avian kingdom the pool of influenza viruses is 
perpetuated. The discovery of a novel subtype that may have an impact on human health or 
our economic system will need to be tracked and new outbreaks anticipated. Further 
knowledge about the epidemiology of AIV in the natural carriers can facilitate this work, 
knowing from the geographic location of the outbreak, and the temporal movements of 
carriers through this area, the direction and mannerism the infection will take, provided a 
spill-over back to the natural carriers occur. Keeping in mind that this mode of transport is not 
the only mechanism by which a pandemic may incite, it is a factor that is of vital importance 
to take into account for outbreak management. It is also important to increase our 
understanding of how influenza A virus interacts with its many different hosts, and what 
mechanisms exert pressure on the virus to change its characteristics.  
The stability of OC is something that may become a rising problem with the increased use of 
oseltamivir worldwide. As the possible severity of influenza pandemics become more 
publicly known, the demand for prophylactic use of oseltamivir increases. If there is not a 
clearly stated guideline to be restrictive with the prescription of oseltamivir-containing drugs, 
and the threshold for the use of such drugs in lowered, increased environmental level of OC 
can be excepted. As shown in paper IV, low levels of OC may induce resistance in avian 
viruses. Even levels found today can sporadically induce resistance, and if OC levels 
increases further, there is indication of resistant strains becoming dominant. Considering that 
most plans constructed to minimize the impact of future pandemics of highly pathogenic 
influenza rely heavily on Tamiflu, the introduction of a highly pathogenic virus which is 
already resistant to OC effectively circumvents the in many cases primary defense to acutely 
infected patients. 
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